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Abstract:  
We explain the persistence of low performances in African agriculture by analyzing 
the determinants of farmers’ decisions to modernize their farming practices. Owing to 
sociocultural factors specific to Sub-Saharan Africa, farmers’ decisions on farming 
practices are strategic complements. We demonstrate that the modernization game 
these farmers play admits two pure-strategy, Pareto-ranked, symmetric Nash-
equilibria. The equilibrium where all farmers choose to modernize their farming 
methods is preferred to the one where all of them choose to stick to a traditional 
method. We argue that scarcity and economic opportunities put forward by neo-
Boserupian theories of induced-innovation as determinants of the onset of 
agricultural innovations are, in the context of African countries, only necessary, but 
not sufficient to generate modernization of farming methods. Deliberate action to 
enhance adoption of agricultural innovations must therefore take the African’s 
sociocultural context into consideration, or risk failure. 
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I. Introduction
Until recently, the literature on technological innovations in agriculture has been dominated
by neo-Boserupian theories of induced innovation, emphasizing scarcity and economic op-
portunities as the main determinants of the emergence of new agricultural innovations.1
For example, Yujiro Hayami and Vernon M. Ruttan [1985] formalize and empirically verify
a theory of induced innovation, linking the emergence of agricultural innovations to eco-
nomic conditions. Anya McGuirk and Yair Mundlak [1991] argue that the introduction
of guaranteed markets for Punjabi food grain production by the government procurement
policy enhanced the adoption of high-yield wheat and rice varieties in Punjab, India. Abe
Goldman [1993] suggests that technological change in a region is determined both by fac-
tors scarcities and marketing opportunities. Davis Sunding and David Zilberman [2000]
argue that food shortages or high prices of agricultural commodities will likely lead to
the introduction of new high-yield variety, and may provide the background for new in-
novations that modify product quality. Interestingly, most of these conditions have been
present in Sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter SSA). On one hand, despite the fact that in
SSA, agriculture is the main source of economic growth (Bocar Diagana [2003]),2 and the
majority of the sub-region’s population derives its livelihood from agricultural activities
(Gershon Feder, Richard Just and David Zilberman [1985]; Danielle Resnick [2004]), the
United Nations Conference on Nutrition (UNSCN [2004]) reports that 33 percent of SSA
population was undernourished in 2000, among which children were reported as particu-
larly vulnerable. Food scarcity thus is clearly a pressing problem in this sub-region, which
creates a potential demand for food staples. On the other hand, interventions from both
African governments and the international donor community have helped create economic
opportunities for farmers, including free or subsidized training to enhance best farming
1Neo-Boserupian theories are those that build around the seminal work of Esther Boserup [1965].
2In SSA, the agricultural sector accounted in 1997 for about 35% of Gross Domestic Product, 40% of
its exports and about 70% of employment (World Bank, 1997). It is also estimated in 1993 that, due to
its stimulating eﬀects on industry, transport and services, a 1% growth in agriculture generates an overall
economic growth of 1.5% (Word Bank, 1993).
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practices, and availability of land-saving, and yield-enhancing biotechnology3.
Economic conditions thus seem ripe for agricultural innovation to unfold in SSA. Yet,
SSA agriculture has continued to under perform with respect to farming practices, output
growth, and adoption of yield-enhancing innovations. First, Figure 1 below indicates that
SSA’s average agricultural value-added per worker persistently lags behind that of all other
developing regions, including East Asia and Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, and
South Asia.4
Figure 1: Agricultural value-added per  worker (constant 2000 US$)
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3At the international level, key bilateral donors, including the Department for international Develop-
ment (DFID), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the US Agency for interna-
tional Development (USAID) have developed extensive agricultural and rural development programs such
as micro-credit programs and, extensive fertilizer aid to small African farmers (Danielle Resnick [2004]).
In 1996 for instance, Africa received the largest amount worldwide of Japan’s Grant Aid for the Increase
of Food Production (41%), while the remaining aid was distributed to Asia (28%), Central and South
America (15%), the middle East (8%) and East Europe (8%). The largest recipient include Kenya—with
one billion yen worth of agricultural inputs, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Zambia (The World Bank [1999]).
At the domestic level, fertilizer subsidies were adopted by almost all African countries’ governments and
farmers were often freely trained and largely sensitized to its use. In the early 1980s, explicit fertilizer
subsidies were widespread, by 25 percent in Malawi, 60 percent in Tanzania, 50 percent in Cameroon,
46 percent in Senegal and 85 percent in Nigeria. In addition, many African governments also adopted
macroeconomic policies that include currency overvaluation, budgetary constraints and foreign exchange
restrictions aimed at impacting significantly on fertilizers prices (The World Bank [1999]).
4Available data also indicate that during this period, SSA’s average agricultural value added per worker
was 84 percent of the average for East Asia and Pacific; 77 percent of the average for and South Asia and,
only 12 percent of that of the Latin America and the Caribbean region (World Development Indicators
2005).
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Second, Figure 2 below indicates that agricultural growth has been the lowest in SSA
during the 1993-2001 period, when compared to other developing regions, including East
Asia and Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean , and South Asia.
Figure 2: Regional trend in agricultural value-added  (constant 2000 billion 
US$)
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Third, Figure 3 sums up the relatively poor performance of SSA agriculture with respect
to fertilizer
use.5
Figure 3: R egional Trends in fertilizer consum ption (100 gram  per hectar of arable land)
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5According to the Word Bank Report 1999, the observed trend of low fertilizer use in Africa continues
to raise concerns about the continent’s ability to overcome it food problems because these low application
rates have severe consequences for the fertility of the soil and the sustanability of agricultural production.
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All the above facts raise concerns about reliance on neo-Boserupian theories of induced
innovation as a guideline for understanding African agriculture. From an empirical point
of view, these concerns have found a resounding echo in a recent series of field experiments
undertaken by Esther Duflo, Michael Kremer and Jonathan Robinson [2005]. They study
the use of fertilizer in Busia, a relatively poor rural district in Western Kenya, where maize
is the main food staple, and soil fertility is low. Their experiments seek to understand why
so many people in Busia do not use fertilizer even though it appears to have the potential
to generate high on-farm yield increases, which in turn will improve farmers’s well-being
as well as food security in the region. Before their experiments, only 10% of farmers used
fertilizer at any point in time, despite Busia being characterized by periodical episodes
of food shortage, while fertilizer were available in small packages that required no large
investment.6 Furthermore, Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson also reveal that 80% of Busia
farmers who received training on how to use fertilizer were still not using it. According to
Esther Duflo [2006], 98% of these farmers reported facing a savings problem, that hindered
their ability to finance the purchase of fertilizers. So when, in another experiment, farmers
were presented the option of buying a non-refundable, non-transferable voucher for fertilizer
delivery in the sowing season, Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson [2005] notice that 83% of them
accepted the voucher-for-fertilizer scheme. But why couldn’t farmers come up with their
own savings arrangements to mitigate the savings problem each of them faced?
In this paper, we address this question by providing a simple theoretical guide to the
empirical findings by Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson [2005]. Such a theory must be able
to explain the coexistence of low innovation rates in agriculture with economic conditions
which neo-Boserupian theories find essential for the onset of technological innovations in
agriculture, namely economic opportunities and scarcity. We develop a game-theoretic
model whereby self-employed farmers simultaneously choose whether or not to modernize
farming through the use of a commercial input package—including fertilizers. In our model,
6For instance, Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson [2005] discover that it cost 8 shillings, less than the price
of 1 kilogram of maize—the main staple cereals in the region— to apply fertilizer on an area of 30 square
meters.
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each farmer lives in a financially isolated community,7 and has a choice between two crop-
ping methods for the production of an agricultural staple. A farmer may choose to stick
to a traditional, low-productivity method whereby own labor is the only essential input at
farming, or she may elect to modernize farming through the adoption of yield-enhancing
biotechnology, of which fertilizers are a major component. Since fertilizers are often sold at
subsidized prices, each farmer can finance their purchase through her own savings, rather
than loans (Esther Duflo [2006]). For this purpose, she may need to save part of the pro-
ceeds from her sales of last season crop in order to invest in the adoption of fertilizers for
the new season. Yet, she may decide against saving, for example if she is unable to protect
her savings from social predation.8
Form an empirical point of view, evidence of social predation abounds in SSA. Based on
a field research conducted in Southern provinces of Zambia between January and August
2000, Karin Verstralen [2001] documents the presence of sociocultural factors such as tradi-
tional ceremonies—e.g., marriage, initiation rites and funerals— that aﬀect savings behavior
because they often involve the generation and the redistribution of social payments. Renée
Chao-Béroﬀ [2003] reports increased daily social pressures in rural African areas where
banking services are generally inaccessible and concludes that without a savings discipline
amongst rural populations, it is diﬃcult for an individual in this environment to resist social
pressures that make savings fungible. Stefan Ambec and Nicolas Treich [2002] argue that
in rural societies of many developing countries, traditional values press investment-minded
individuals to spread their money within their community. In Busia and Teso districts of
Western Kenya, where Rotating savings and credit associations (Roscas) are very general-
ized,9 Mary Kay Gugerty [2003] finds that these associations represent essentially financial
7Jonathan Conning and Christopher Udry (2005) find that in a financially isolated community, agents
will only transform one set of variables and uncertain cash flows into another using available production
and storage technologies and local financial instruments.
8Hernando De Soto (2000) reports that the growing need to secure savings has become prevalent in the
rural sectors of most developing countries where agents remain cut-oﬀ from many of the opportunities for
investing, risk-taking and risk spreading that would be available through better financial integration into
larger national and global financial markets.
9Mary Kay Gugerty (2003) documents that in 1986, 50 percent of the adult population in the Congo
belonged to a rosca, while participation ranged from 50 to 95 percent in many rural areas in Liberia, Ivory
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agreements to cope with social pressures that force investment-minded individuals to part
with their savings in an unproductive manner. She claims that Roscas are informal fi-
nancial arrangements designed by a collection of investment-minded individuals to provide
participants with a technology for shielding their savings from social predation. This im-
plies that, by themselves, individuals are able to design contractual arrangements to solve
their problems. But why couldn’t farmers, by themselves, come up with such arrangement
to solve their farming modernization problem?
Unlike other economic activities, agriculture is a sequence of seasonal, interrelated,
calendar events– including a sowing season where all farmers purchase and use agricultural
inputs, and a harvesting season where they all collect and sell their agricultural staples.
Thus farmers face identical calendar events, and their ability to save in order to finance
modernization of farming methods may therefore hinge on the extent to which they can
find a savings mobilization technology that satisfies the constraint that all farmers access
their savings at the same time. In such an environment, an informal mechanism of mutual
cooperation such as Roscas are not suitable. There are two main reasons for this. First,
everyone needs his savings at the same moment (sowing season). Second, all farmers earn
their income at the same time (harvesting season). In absence of a savings mobilization
technology that satisfies these constraints, a farmer may not be able to save, unless a
significant number of other farmers follow suit. The more there are other farmers who save,
the higher likelihood that a farmer who saves will be able to protect her savings from social
predation, simply because with more farmers saving, each one of them will feel less social
pressure to part with her savings in an unproductive manner. Consequently, an essential
feature of the environment underlying farmers’ decisions to save in this agrarian community
is the complementarity of their respective strategies: a farmer’s decision to save (in order
to finance modernization of her farming practices) increases other farmers marginal gain
from following suit. In the absence of a mechanism for inducing coordination of farmers’
Coast, Togo, and Nigeria. In 1992, membership in roscas in Cameroun was estimated at 80 percent of the
adult population and in several villages in Nigeria in 1987, adult membership was found to be 66 percent
of the population.
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strategies, the non-cooperative game these farmers play admits two pure-strategy Nash-
equilibria: a modernization equilibrium where all of them choose to save in order to finance
the purchase of yield-increasing inputs, and a traditional equilibrium where they all remain
trapped inside the prevalent agricultural status quo. When the traditional equilibrium
obtains despite the well-known high-yield potential of biotechnologies, and the aﬀordability
of these technologies made possible by government’s subsidies10, it must be because of a
lack of a coordination mechanism–for example in the form of a savings technology that
can mitigate social predation.
There is extensive empirical evidence that strategic complementarities abounds in rural
agrarian environments. For example, Timothy Besley and Anne Case [1994] showed that
in India, adoption of high-yield variety (HYV) seeds by an individual is correlated with
adoption among their neighbors. Andrew D. Foster and Mark R. Rosenzweig [1995] who
study the use of fertilizer during the early years of the Green Revolution in India find that
the profitability of HYV seeds increased with past experimentation, of either the farmers
or others in the village. Timothy Conley and Christopher Udry [2005] show that pineapple
farmers in Ghana imitate the choice of fertilizer quantity of their neighbors when the latter
have a good shock, and move further away from these decisions when they have a bad
shock. We build around this literature by emphasizing access to a savings technology as
another source of strategic complementarities among same-community farmers. The rest of
this paper is organized as follows. The model is presented and solved in section 2. Section
3 oﬀers concluding remarks.
II. The Framework
Consider an agrarian community consisting of N ex ante homogenous self-employed farm-
ers, each endowed with a plot of farm land in which she grows a single agricultural crop. As
essential means for boosting on farm yield, assume a land-saving, biotechnology is intro-
10James A. Roumasset [2004] reveals that agricultural economists typically recommend a panoply of
goverment interventions to go along with the investments in new technologies and infrastructure, including
price-supports and stabilization schemes, credit and input subsidies, and crop insurance.
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duced in this region.11 For the sake of simplicity, assume this agrarian community lasts for
four periods representing two identical cropping cycles. Each cycle consists of two seasons,
a sowing season (i.e., season 1) and a harvest season (i.e., season 2). The farmer’s harvest
is entirely sold in a competitive market by the end of the season.
During the first cropping cycle, it is assumed all farmers use a traditional method of
production at sowing—combining land with own labor as the only essential inputs. However,
at the end of the first cycle, i.e., after the first harvest is sold, each farmer may consider
modernizing her farming practices, by combining recommended commercial biotechnology
with land and own-labor.12 The purchase of the recommended commercial input package
must be self-financed, which requires a period of savings.
A. Informal Savings under Social Pressures
Let k > 0, denote the level savings required to purchase the recommended quantity of
commercial biotechnology. Therefore, at the end of the first harvest season, a typical self-
employed farmer i ∈ I, (where I = {1, 2, ......., N}) faces a binary decision in preparation
for the next cropping cycle: either she saves a part of the proceeds of the sale of her first
harvest (i.e., k), in order to modernize her farming practices during the next cycle, or she
does not save, in which case she maintains a traditional production method throughout
the two cycles. In other words, at the end of the first agricultural cycle, each farmer either
takes an action si = 1, meaning she commits to saving the amount of money needed to
purchase the recommended input package at the opening of the next cropping period; or
she takes an action si = 0, meaning she commits to maintaining the status quo for next
11 One can think of this bio-technology as an input package including, for example, high yielding varieties,
and assorted fertilizer.
12 Dunstan Spencer [2001] reveals that in Africa, small-scale farms account for over 90 percent of the
agricultural production and are dominated by the poor. This has a major implication for the rate of
innovation in farming, as the poor often have diﬃculties accessing the constituents of agricultural best
practice. In this setting therefore, it is assumed the use of land-saving biotechnologies will generate signi-
ficative increases in yields if and only if a typical self-employed farmer purchases the whole recommanded
commercial inputs package.
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cycle, in which case she does not save.
However, in this community with no alternative formal individual savings commitment
technologies, it is assumed traditional values can press those who decide to save to spread
their money within their community.13 Therefore, denote as
κn = α (n) k, (II.1)
the net savings entirely controlled by a self-employed farmer who decide to modernize her
farming practices, when n =
P
i si, farmers elected to save. Thus, α (n) ∈ [0, 1], represents
the fraction of her savings a typical farmer is able to protect from traditional sharing
obligations.
Assumption 1. The function α satisfies the following property:
α (n) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
α if n < n∗
1 if n ≥ n∗
(II.2)
where α ∈ (0, 1), and n∗ ∈ (1, N) denotes the threshold number of self-employed
farmers involved in a farming modernization activity, above which choosing to save
entails no traditional sharing obligation for a farmer.
Assumption 1 highlights the importance for smallholder farmers, as a group, to over-
come social pressures that give rise to savings predation, preventing them frommodernizing
their farming activities. That n∗ is bounded below by 1 means that by privately accumu-
lating savings alone, a typical farmer will suﬀer from the highest social pressures from
doing so.14
13For empirical evidences of this feature, see Jean Phillipe Platteau (2000) and James Wendy (1979).
14As therefore implied by condition (II.2), that n < n∗, means that a higher demand of others will
undermine farmer i’s incentive to adopt a high-productive technology. In this case, all farmers will stagnate
and remain poor. By contrast however, that n ≥ n∗, the higher is the ability for farmers to use land-saving
biotechnologies introduced in their region. This may be done through the implementation of a savings
discipline in this community, by oﬀering farmers an instrument to save through for instance the creation of
a all-farmers new commercial inputs purchasing association enabling participants to purchase commercial
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B. Farmer’s Welfare
Denote as π, the gross earned-income a typical farmer claims, when she remains trapped
into the agricultural status quo during the next cropping cycle. By contrast, let
π (κn) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
π if n < n∗
π¯ if n ≥ n∗
(II.3)
denote a farmer’s returns to cropping when she chooses to modernize her agricultural
activities. The term κn is as defined in (II.1) and π < π¯ by construction.
Therefore, when a typical farmer chooses to play si = 0, she only claims π, after the
second harvest. But, when she chooses to play si = 1, she claims the residual π if n < n∗,
and π¯ > π, if individual savings was to be totally secured for traditional sharing obligations,
i.e., if n ≥ n∗.
Next, assume each farmer i ∈ I, enjoys a level of seasonal consumption of a numeraire
good, as proxied by cij, at the end of each cycle j (j = 1, 2). Thus, a typical farmer i’s
budget constraint in cycle j is then given as follows:
ci1 + sik ≤ π, j = 1 (II.4)
ci2 ≤ (1− si)π + siπ (κn) j = 2 (II.5)
where π (κn) is as defined in (II.3).
Let u : C → <, denote a typical farmer’s periodic utility function, where u ¡cij¢ repre-
sents the periodic utility level she attains when she consumes an amount, cij.
Assumption 2. The function u : C → < has the following property for all c0 > c,
u (c0)− u (c) > 0.
Assumption 2 implies that more consumption is always better for all farmers in this
environment.
inputs immediately after the first harvest. Hence, that n ≥ n∗, can thus be interpreted as implying that
in order for an inputs purchasing association to be a viable collective barrier against traditional sharing
obligations, there must be a higher number of self-employed farmers participants.
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Let V : {0, 1} × [0, N ] be a real valued function with typical argument (si, n) , where
si ∈ {0, 1}, and n ∈ [0, N ]. We denote as
V (si, n) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
(1 + β)u (π) if si = 0
u (π − k) + βeϑ (n) if si = 1 (II.6)
where
eϑ (n) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
u (π) if n < n∗
u (π¯) if n ≥ n∗
and β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the usual intertemporal discounting factor.
As implied by assumption 2, if si = 1 and n < n∗, V (1, n) < V (0, n). Thus, in a state
where n < n∗, social pressures will become so harmful to a typical farmer that she will be
inclined to reject agricultural innovations introduced in her community.
Assumption 3. The parameters π¯, π and k satisfy the following condition:
β [u (π¯)− u (π)] > u (π)− u (π − k) (II.7)
Assumption 3 simply guarantees that all farmers in this environment have the incentive
to use the commercial biotechnology. It reflects the existence, in this rural environment,
of the neo-Boserupian condition of profitable market opportunities necessary for the onset
of technological innovations in agriculture. The left-hand term of condition (II.7) (i.e.,
β [u (π¯)− u (π)]) represents the benefits from modernizing, measured in utils; while its
right-hand term (i.e., u (π) − u (π − k)) denotes the cost, also in utils, of modernizing.
Condition (II.7) therefore states that in this rural environment, the benefits of modernizing
outweigh its costs. But, because modernization is conditional upon a farmer being able
to secure her entire savings, how many farmers will therefore choose to modernize is the
outcome of a non-cooperative game between the N rural farmers living in the targeted
community.15
15In this rural community with no formal, legally binding savings mechanisms, an informal mechanism
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C. The Modernization Game
Let I = {1, ...., N} be the finite set of self-employed farmers. The strategy set for each
farmer i ∈ I, is denoted as Si = {0, 1}, with a generic element si ∈ Si. In addition, we
adopt the following notations. Let S = ×i∈ISi denote the strategy space, whose elements
s = (si, s−i) ∈ S define a strategy profile.16 Let S−i = ×{j∈I; j 6=i}Sj be the set of feasible
joint strategies for farmers other than farmer i, with s−i ∈ S−i. Observe that since Si is
finite for all i, S = Si × S−i is also finite and contains a total of 2N elements.
C.1. Payoﬀ Functions
Continuing our description of the normal-form of the farming modernization game, we now
turn our attention to the players’ utility payoﬀ functions. Let Ui : S → <, denote farmer
i’s payoﬀ function associated with a strategy profile Si = (si, s−i), where Ui (s) ≡ V (si, n)
represents farmer i’s payoﬀ. The number n =
P
i si, denotes the cardinality of the subset
of farmers who choose to play the strategy si = 1.
Thus, as an implication of (II.6), if farmer i plays the strategy si = 0, she will gain a
payoﬀ
Ui (0, s−i) = (1 + β)u (π) ,
irrespective of what other farmers do.
In contrast, if she plays the strategy si = 1, she will gain a payoﬀ
Ui (1, s−i) = u (π − k) + βu (π) ,
if n < n∗ ; while she will gain a payoﬀ
of mutual cooperation such as saving by lending is not suitable. There are two main reasons for this. First,
the activity that people are involved in is seasonal and everyone needs his saving at the same moment.
Second, as long as income is seasonal, all farmers therefore earn their income at the same moment.
16si can represents the message sent by a typical farmer to his collectivity, when S denotes the set of
messages within the same population of farmers.
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Ui (1, s−i) = u (π − k) + βu (π¯) ,
if n ≥ n∗.
A non-cooperative normal-form of the farming modernization game is the triple Γ =
hI, S, {Ui : i ∈ I}i , consisting of a nonempty set of players I, a set S of feasible joint farming
modernization strategies, and a collection of payoﬀ functions {Ui : i ∈ I} .Notice that, since
players all have identical strategy sets i.e., S1 = S2, ... = SN and for all i, j ∈ {1, ...., N} ,
Ui (s) = Uj (s) , for all i 6= j , the normal-form game Γ is symmetric.17
C.2. Nash Equilibria in Pure Strategies
The problem set out in this subsection— that of determining farmers’ choice of the type
of agricultural practices— is characterized here through the set of Nash equilibria when
all farmers make their agricultural innovation’s decision simultaneously. We define a pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) in terms of the payoﬀs players receive from various strategy
profiles:
Definition 1. A pure-strategy profile s∗ ∈ S is a NE of Γ if and only if Ui (s∗) ≥
Ui
¡
si, s∗−i
¢
for all si ∈ Si and all i ∈ I.
Let LΓ denote the set of Nash equilibria of the game Γ. Let s1 ∈ S and s0 ∈ S
be feasible strategy profiles, where s1 (respectively s0) is the strategy profile such that
all farmers choose to purchase and to use the recommended commercial inputs package
during the opening of the next cropping cycle, i.e., si = 1 for all i (respectively opt for
the agricultural status quo at sowing, i.e., si = 0, for all i). First, we obtain the following
result proved in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1-3, {s0, s1} ∈ LΓ.
17Thus, the identity of the players does not matter and we do not need to consider strategy profile
separately.
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Proposition 1 states that the strategy profile where all farmers choose the agricultural
status quo (si = 0, all i ) and the strategy profile where they all use the recommended level
of biotechnology in their agricultural activities (i.e., si = 1, all i) are both Nash equilibria
of the non-cooperative game Γ.
Before we proceed to derive further policy implications from the result outlined in
Proposition 1, we must address the question of whether the strategy profiles s0 and s1 are
indeed the only stable equilibria of the symmetric game, Γ. After all, there is no a priory
guarantee that a symmetric game with strategic complementarities only has symmetric
equilibria. Therefore to address this issue of whether {s0, s1} are indeed the only equilibria
of the modernization game, we first show that Γ is indeed a supermodular game (as this
concept is defined and used in Paul Milgrom and John Roberts [1990]), also known as a
game characterized by strategic complementarities.
Definition 2. (Paul Milgrom and John Roberts [1990]) Γ is a supermodular game, if for
all i,
(i) Si is a compact subset of <;
(ii) Ui is upper semi continuous in si, for each fixed s−i;
(iii) Ui is continuous in s−i, for each fixed si;
(iv) Ui has a finite upper bound ;
(v) Ui has (strictly) increasing diﬀerences in (si, s−i) on Si × S−i.
In particular, property (v) of Definition 2 implies that, for a typical small self-employed
farmer i, the incremental gain from taking a higher action is higher, when other farmers
also play their highest action: for all s0i > si and s0−i > s−i,18
18As an implication of property (v) of Definition 3, each player will therefore choose a higher action
when other players increase their action.
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Ui
¡
s0i, s0−i
¢
− Ui
¡
si, s0−i
¢
≥ Ui (s0i, s−i)− Ui (si, s−i) .
The importances of supermodular games in this paper lies with several crucial properties
these games have. First, the major characteristic of games with strategic complementarities
is the presence of Pareto-ranked equilibria, which creates the possibility for coordination
failures (Peter A. Diamond [1982]; Russell Cooper and Andrew John [1988]). Second, with
a supermodular game, there is no need for mixed-strategies to ensure the existence of a Nash
equilibrium, as the existence of equilibrium of such game does not require continuity of best
response function (i.e., application of Alfred Tarski’s fixed point theorem). Third, as an
implication of supermodularity, we can easily restrict our analysis to NE in pure strategies,
because when a supermodular game has mixed strategy equilibria, these equilibria are
always «unstable» under a variety of dynamic adjustment process (Federico Echenique
[2002]; Federico Echenique and Aaron S. Edlin [2004]).
To show that the farming modernization game, Γ, is supermodular, it suﬃces to prove
that properties (i)−(v) above are satisfied. We prove the following proposition in Appendix
B.
Proposition 2. Under assumptions 1-3, the symmetric farming modernization game Γ,
is supermodular.
Proposition 2 implies that conditions underlying Donald M. Topkis’ theorem apply, so
that for the game Γ, each small self-employed farmer’s best response function ζi : S−i → Si
, where
ζ i (s−i) ∈ argmaxsi Ui (s) ,
is strictly increasing in the strategy profile chosen by players other than herself: for all i,
and for all s0−i > s−i, ζ i
¡
s0−i
¢
> ζ i (s−i). Indeed, given the properties of the function ζi,
a pure-strategy Nash-equilibrium of Γ always exists, by the application of Alfred Tarski’s
fixed-point theorem.
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Now, since the best replies, ζi (s−i), are increasing, players’ strategies are complements,
implying that Γ indeed admits multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Thus, to rule out
asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria, we show in the following Lemma —which we
proved in Appendix C—, that farmers’ best responses are single-valued correspondences
(i.e., each ζ i is a function):
Lemma 1. Let ζ i (s−i) = {si : si ∈ argmaxsi∈Si Ui (si, s−i)}, for all i, given s−i. Then,
under Assumptions 1-3, ζ i (s−i) is a singleton.
Lemma 1 states that given s−i ∈ S−i, Ui (., s−i) has a unique maximizer in Si. In other
words, players best replies are single-valued. This result combined with the application of
Topkis’ theorem rules out the existence of asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria for
the farming modernization game, Γ. Hence the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1-3 , {s0, s1} = LΓ.
Proposition 3 states that the strategy profile where all farmers elect to maintain the
status quo and the one where they all elect to save and therefore modernize their agri-
cultural practices are the only pure-strategy Nash-equilibria of the farming modernization
game, Γ.
As an implication of Proposition 3, it follows that, in an environment with strategic
complementarities, individual (farm-level) adoption of high-productive land-saving biotech-
nologies introduced in the community is strongly determined by the aggregate behavior.
In other words, "when in Rome", it pays to "do as the Romans do".
The multiplicity of equilibria outlined in Proposition 3 suggests that there is a role
for a potential deliberate action to help farmers in selecting one of these equilibria. But
such an action is desirable only if the two equilibria can be ranked according to the Pareto
principle. The following Proposition therefore establishes the needed ranking.
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1-3, the symmetric pure-strategy profile s1 Pareto
dominates the profile s0.
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Proof. To prove this Proposition, it suﬃces to show that for all i ∈ I, and for all
si ∈ Si, Ui (s1)−Ui (s0) > 0. To proceed, let Λi ≡ Ui (s1)−Ui (s0) . From the definition of
the payoﬀ function Ui, the diﬀerence Λi reduces to
Λi = β [u (π¯)− u (π)]− [u (π)− u (π − k)]
The result simply follows from condition (II.7). This completes the proof.
Proposition 4 states that the strategy profile where all farmers elect to modernize their
farming practices by adopting high-productive land-saving biotechnologies is strictly pre-
ferred to the one where they all elect to maintain the status quo. Because the modernization
equilibrium (i.e. s1) is counter-intuitive for SSA economies characterized by a persistent
low performance of the agricultural sector, our analysis suggests that SSA’s persistent
poor record of agricultural modernization reflects a coordination failure in farmers’ savings
strategies. Our analysis also suggests that the creation of new, less-fungible savings prod-
ucts by helping SSA farmers overcome social pressures to divert their savings from their
intended use may indeed boost modernization of SSA agriculture.
III. Conclusion
This paper had two principal goals. The first was to show how the sociocultural context
impacts farmers’ decisions to modernize their agricultural activities. The sociocultural
context we considered was highlighted by the prevalence, in African rural communities, of
traditional sharing obligations that present innovation-minded individuals with self-control
problems on their private financial and non financial assets. The second goal was to inves-
tigate necessary and suﬃcient conditions for farmers to modernize their farming practices.
We drew from the existing literature in assuming that the introduction of high-productivity,
land-saving biotechnologies in agriculture was a determining factor of on farm productiv-
ity increase. We also maintain that the African environment, with the exception of war-
torn countries, potentially oﬀers profitable economic opportunities for smallholder farmers,
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which, according to neo-Boserupian theorists accounts for the decision to introduce tech-
nological innovations in agriculture. To achieve these two goals, we used a game-theoretic
framework featuring a supermodular game of farming modernization decision between ex
ante homogenous self-employed farmers. We demonstrated that this game admits two
pure-strategy, Pareto-ranked, symmetric Nash-equilibria. The equilibrium where all farm-
ers choose to modernize their farming methods is preferred to the one where all of them
choose to remain trapped in the agricultural status quo. Because of the multiplicity of
equilibria, we concluded that, scarcity and economic opportunities for farmers, which have
been put forward by neo-Boserupian agricultural economists as determinants for the onset
of technological innovations in agriculture, are, in the context of African countries, only
necessary, but not suﬃcient to generate modernization of farming methods. Indeed, co-
ordination failures in farming modernization choices may prevent farmers from mitigating
traditional sharing obligations that hinder their saving eﬀorts. We argued that a suﬃcient
condition for the introduction of land-saving technologies in African countries to succeed
in increasing food crop supply is, put in Jean Phillipe Platteau’s words, to provide a so-
cially accepted alibi to protect people’s savings against all sorts of social pressures. This
could be done, for example, by introducing new savings products say, non-refundable and
non-transferable vouchers as argued by Esther Duflo [2006]. Such savings technology may
help mitigate social pressures that increase the fungibility of farmers’ savings.
18
IV. Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1.
The proof is divided in two claims:
Claim 1 The strategy profile s0 = (s01, ....s0i , ....s0N) such that si = 0, for all i, is a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of Γ.
Proof: Using the definition of a payoﬀ function, it follows from definition 1 that the
profile s0 is a strict pure-strategy NE of Γ if and only if the following condition is always
satisfied for all i:
u (π) (1 + β)− V (1, 0) ≥ 0 (IV.1)
Since n∗ > 1, the result then clearly follows from the definition of function V, and the
strictly increasing property of the function u i.e., u (π) > u (π − k).
Claim 2. The strategy profile s1 = (s11, ....s1i , ....s1N) such that si = 1 , for all i, is a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of Γ.
Proof: With inequality (II.7) in hands, the proof follows in the same manner as in
claim 1. Hence the result.
B. Proof of Proposition 2.
To prove proposition 2, first, observe that for all i, Si = {0, 1} , is clearly a compact
subset of <, since Si is closed and bounded. Therefore property (i) of a supermodular
game is trivially satisfied. Second, to establish property (ii) and (iii), it suﬃces to prove
the following claim:
Claim 1. For all i ∈ I, the function Ui : S → <, is continuous on S, where S = ×i∈ISi.
Proof. Since Si is finite for all i, it follow that S is also finite, as the Cartesian product
of a finite number of finite sets. Indeed, S has cardinal equal to 2N , which is finite, since
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N is a finite number. Therefore, by theorem19, Ui is continuous on S. This establishes
property (ii) and (iii) of a strictly supermodular game.
Third, to establish property (iv) , it suﬃces to prove the following claim:
Claim 2. For all i ∈ I, the function Ui : S → <, attains a maximum on S.
Proof. Since the set of feasible joint strategies reduced to S is finite and has no more
than 2N elements, we also have that Vi (S) ⊂ < is also finite; and finite subsets of < always
contain their upper and lower bounds. It therefore follows that, Ui has a finite upper bound
on S. This completes the proof of this claim.
Fourth, the following claim establishes property (v) .
Claim 3. Under assumptions 1-3, the function Ui : S → < has increasing diﬀerences
in (si, s−i) on Si × S−i : for all i ∈ I, for all s0i > si and s0−i > s−i,
Ui
¡
s0i, s0−i
¢
− Ui
¡
si, s0−i
¢
≥ Ui (s0i, s−i)− Ui (si, s−i) (IV.2)
Proof. Suppose that for all i ∈ I, s0i > si and s0−i > s−i but,
Ui
¡
s0i, s0−i
¢
− Ui
¡
si, s0−i
¢
< Ui (s0i, s−i)− Ui (si, s−i) . (IV.3)
We will show that inequality (IV.3) leads to a contradiction. First, observe that in-
equality (IV.3) can be written as follows:
Ui
¡
s0i, s0−i
¢
− Ui (s0i, s−i) < Ui
¡
si, s0−i
¢
− Ui (si, s−i) . (IV.4)
Next, since si ∈ {0, 1}, for all i ∈ I, take s0i = 1 and si = 0. Then , it can be shown
that (IV.4) reduces to
V (1, n0)− V (1, en) < 0 (IV.5)
where
19Theorem (continuity with opened sets): Any function defined on a finite set is continuous.
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n0 = 1 +
X
j
s0j
en = 1 +X
j
sj
Since s0−i > s−i, its follows by construction that en < n0. Now, If en < n0 < n∗ then from
(II.6), it follows that V (1, n0)− V (1, en) = 0 and we reach a contradiction. If en < n∗ ≤ n0
instead, then (IV.5) reduces to
u (π¯)− u (π) < 0.
Contradiction again, since by Assumption 2, the function u (.) is strictly increasing in its
argument, i.e., u (π¯) > u (π). This completes the proof
C. Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. To prove Lemma 1, it suﬃces to show that given s−i ∈ S−i, and for all
pairs (s0i , s1i ) ∈ Si × Si such that s0i 6= s1i , Ui (s0i , s−i) 6= Ui (s1i , s−i). Suppose by way of
contradiction that for some i ∈ I , and for some bs−i ∈ S−i, we have
Ui
¡
s0i , bs−i¢ = Ui ¡s1i , bs−i¢ (IV.6)
Since Si = {0, 1}, for all i ∈ I, take s0i = 0 and s1i = 1. Then, we can rewrite (IV.6) as
follow:
Ui (0, bs−i) = Ui (1, bs−i) ,
which, using the definition of function Ui, reduces to
(1 + β)u (π) = V (1, bn) (IV.7)
where
bn =X
i
bsi
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Now, suppose that bsj = 0, for all j 6= i. Then, since 1 < n∗, equality (IV.7) reduces to
u (π) = u (π − k) (IV.8)
which is a contradiction of Assumption 2 implying that u (π) > u (π − k) . Likewise,
suppose that bsj = 1, for all j 6= i. If bn < n∗, then, equality (IV.7) reduces again to (IV.8)
and we also reach a contradiction once more. If bn ≥ n∗, then (IV.7) reduces to
(1 + β)u (π) = u (π − k) + βu (π¯) (IV.9)
which contradicts condition (II.7) implying that (1 + β)u (π) < u (π − k)+βu (π¯) . Hence
the result.
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